With 19550 MW installed in 2013, India is considered a success story in terms of net installed capacity of wind power. Few existing studies on wind energy in India have highlighted the important role of institutions, and most lack a detailed account of how influential institutions came about through the work of advocacy groups, or tend to focus on short time periods. This paper uses the notion of collective institutional entrepreneurship to analyse institutionalisation of wind energy in India across three time periods (1985-1995, 1995-2003, and 2003-2013). The analysis shows that wind power development in India was driven by efforts of collective institutional entrepreneurs using two aggregated strategies, i.e.
Introduction
Wind energy is developing rapidly in India. The Indian wind energy sector began with just 2 MW of installed grid connected power in 1986 [1] . Currently India has installed over 18 GW of wind energy, which is roughly 8% of the total installed electricity generation capacity in surrounding wind energy in India. This paper does so by taking a long-term perspective focusing on the very early wind energy developments in the 1980s up to recent developments in 2013. We study the institutional changes and the role of actors behind those changes by using the notion of collective institutional entrepreneurship, which will be elaborated in the next section.
To above leads us to the following research question: How has institutional entrepreneurship shaped the development of wind energy in India during the time period 1985-2013 and which controversies can be identified? The paper is structured as follows.
First we elaborate on the notion of institutional entrepreneurship. Next we discuss methods used for case study of wind energy in India. The final sections of the paper discuss and conclude.
Collective institutional entrepreneurship
The concept of institutional entrepreneurship was originally proposed by Dimaggio ([12] [13] ) to study to role of agency in institutional changes and has ever since received increasing attention from a range of scholars interested in the role of actors in transforming institutional arrangements. Institutions are the rules, norms and beliefs that constrain and enable actors in their range of possibilities to take action over a range of events, i.e. their agency [14] [15] . In this view, institutions are not just constraining, but also the very fabric to be used for collective action by a range of actors to transform their institutional context.
Particularly in this research we try to understand how actors navigate through institutional contexts and experience phenomena in an institutionally embedded way, with adequate emphasis on 'agency' of (collective) actors in attempts to influence those contexts [16] .
'Agency' is not considered to be a property of an individual, but is conceptualized as relational and 'distributed within the structures that actors themselves have created' [17] . For example, the web of wind energy policies, economic incentives, organizational structures and market rules -the result of over 30 years of wind energy development in India -does not just spell out the 'rules of the game' for the wind energy sector in India, but is also used strategically and continuously by dynamic coalitions of actors to advocate changes for the future of wind energy in India. There is a need for understanding how actors work collectively to exercise power and change the institutions, which enable and constrain their activities.
Institutional entrepreneurship is then defined as "the activities of actors who have an interest in particular institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions or to transform existing ones" [18, p 657] . To qualify as institutional entrepreneurs, individuals must break with existing rules and practices associated with the dominant institutional arrangements and institutionalize the alternative rules, practices, or logics they are championing while also being enabled and limited by the same institutional arrangements [19] [20] .
Institutional entrepreneurs use various strategies such as legitimizing new ways of working, lobbying, petitioning and advocacy [21] . Research has shown that institutional entrepreneurs can be a range of actors and organizations. Examples are executives in firms, profit oriented entrepreneurs, trade associations, professionals in organizations, regulatory authorities, licensing bodies, scientists, government officials, trade and professional associations, civil servants in governmental agencies, educational institutions, media, consumers, civil society groups and the larger public [21] [22] [23] . 2 The processes through which 'agency' is exercised is likely to be full of setbacks and failures with new roadblocks emerging as the innovation progresses. This forces actors to change their well-intended visions and strategies and requires continuous readjustment and learning [25] [26] . Institutional entrepreneurs seek change in collaboration and conflict with other actors simultaneously and may not have a clear foresight to mobilize large-scale changes with well-defined goals and their efforts may not be always successful and often result in undesirable outcomes [27] [28] [29] .
Transforming institutional arrangements therefore requires collective action from a number of institutional entrepreneurs for wider legitimization of new rules, norms and belief systems -also referred to as 'collective institutional entrepreneurship'. This collective institutional entrepreneurship is achieved through sustained collaboration among numerous dispersed actors with different frames of reference, tensions and contradictions in order to create new institutions or transform existing institutions [30] [31] [32] .
The next section proceeds with discussing how the notion of collective institutional entrepreneurship assisted in studying the long-term development of wind energy in India.
Research methods
The focus of this research is on development of wind power in India from 1985-2012. We use a qualitative case study [33] [34] . Qualitative case studies are well suited for emerging phenomena by capturing detailed accounts often overlooked in quantitative data [35] [36] . Yin [34] suggests multiple data sources such as documents, archival records, interviews, direct observations and participant observations for case study research.
For this paper, the data collection started with a preliminary search for written materials on the internet and electronic databases in order to sensitize us with the historical developments in the Indian wind energy sector. 3 We reconstructed the development of wind energy in India by triangulating these secondary sources and developing a time line of events including demonstration projects, policies, technology assessments, establishment of key actors, conferences and research programs (Table 1) . For the analysis of data we took a process rather than outcome view of institutional change [37] . Process analysis describes a series a sequence of events to analyse how things change, in this case the institutional context for wind energy in India, and aims to identify underlying mechanisms of observed patterns in the process of change [38] [39] . Process analysis is messy in nature and requires constant iteration between the data collection, data reduction, representation and analysis [40] . Therefore, a combination of inductive and deductive techniques was used to analyse the data, i.e. the data and theory were considered together.
Prior literature was used to inform data collection and new aggregated concepts were built from the data collected [41] [42][43] [44] .
For the purpose of this paper we developed aggregated strategies of institutional entrepreneurs [45] . On the basis of this iterative process, we defined two distinct kinds of aggregated strategies pursued by institutional entrepreneurs for development of wind energy Table 3 provides details of the aggregation of empirical data into the two aggregated strategies and their relation with the mechanisms identified in the existing literature on institutional entrepreneurship. Supporting price discovery through preferential tariff or competitive bidding.
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Learning through transnational networks [61] Cooperation programmes with Danish government, assistance from Danish consulting organisations in planning, design and implementation of wind farms; support from international development banks and bilateral donor agencies; encouragement of formation of joint ventures; mergers and acquisitions, ease of rules and guidelines for foreign investment, joint R&D activities; collaboration with EU wind energy networks. 
Results
Early socio-technical experimentation with wind energy in India (1985-1995)
Creation of supportive techno-economic and socio-political networks
Efforts to harness wind energy in India were already being done as early as the 1950s. The National Aeronautical Laboratory (NAL) initiated one of the first projects on wind energy in India. 4 They participated in a meeting of the wind power subcommittee of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) in 1954 in order to develop the first models of wind turbines for rural applications. CSIR developed two prototype wind turbines suitable for Indian conditions useful for water pumping applications and battery charging in Indian villages [70] . In 1960 a dedicated wind power division of NAL was established in Bangalore. in Delhi, published an influential paper on wind energy in India. The paper analysed the experiences with wind energy demonstration projects and made recommendations to improve the performance of wind farms. Most notably the paper argued for amending the electricity act to allow for private wind farming as well as numerous economic recommendations to bring down the costs of wind energy production. 7 Based on recommendations in this paper, the Indian government published new policies in 1990 to encourage private sector investments in wind energy [1] . Next to providing financial incentives, a key strategy of the Indian government was to encourage joint ventures and financial and technical collaboration with foreign entities.
Although custom duties on wind turbines were imposed, specific components were excluded from duties by providing concessional exemptions [81] .
The new institutional setting for wind power in India resulted in substantial support from industrial firms who used wind power for captive consumption. These included in particular relatively small cement, smelting and textile industries, but the financial scheme also attracted investors in energy, steel and automobile industries, who wanted to reduce high power usage charges and profit from the use of the AD system [82] [83] [84] . The new institutional setting was so successful that MNES was worried that the accelerated depreciation measure could lead to a gold rush situation as it was seen in California for tax credits [77] . 
Creation of an indigenous innovation infrastructure
In the early 1960s, NAL had systematically studied data from the India Meteorological Department and prepared a wind map for India [71] . 11 In Nevertheless, Indian firms were still very dependent on European firms and India had limited indigenous capabilities for planning and operating wind farms. The number of people with relevant experience in wind energy was still limited. In particular, skills and know-how of project planning, site assessment, site development, operation and maintenance were low and caused many project failures in the early and mid-1990s [79] . Wind developers also faced problems with respect to approval from multiple government departments, acquisition of land, grid problems and complicated procedures often leading to high costs for wind projects. These problems led policy makers to see commercialization of wind energy in India with high degree of scepticism [90] .
Wind energy hype and slow-down (1995-2003)
Creation of supportive techno-economic and socio-political networks
Although the wind energy industry developed substantially, several key problems continued to exist in this period, in particular in relation to a rather bureaucratic approach taken by state energy utilities [92] . 14 In an attempt to deal with this, MNES developed proposals for organizing a more continuous dialogue between state electricity boards, wind developers and MNES by creating committees of representatives [93] . MNES also encouraged public power companies such as the National Hydroelectric Corporation, the Rural Electrification Corporation and the National Thermal Power Corporation to include stakeholder meetings 14 Examples of bureaucratic problems are the ways in which producers were allowed to sell wind power to third parties, high wheeling and banking charges for investors interested in captive consumption of wind energy, energy utilities' refusal to pay wind power producers according to guidelines and buy back rates issued by MNES.
when developing wind projects. 15 Despite these efforts, the wind energy industry remained critical regarding MNES's 'command and control approach' as it still often took decisions without involving other stakeholders [94] . [95] . 16 In 1996, the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) supported wind energy by organizing an energy summit and proposing national goals for renewable energy in India. This meeting suggested providing a more stable investment climate and political commitment for supporting wind power [96] . Industrial groups Tatas and Bajaj as well as major public sector organisations in the energy field also started taking an interest in developing wind energy projects [97] . 17 Nevertheless, sseveral fluctuations in the Indian wind energy market occurred due to unstable policy and institutional environment. The introduction of a tax system for (previously) non-taxable companies, the so-called Minimum Alternative Tax (MAT), had the wind industry seriously fretting until the government clarified that power infrastructure development would be exempted. IREDA raised interest rate on wind energy investment loans, which slowed down the development of wind energy [93] . Speculative investor 15 In its long term vision plan, MNES also set target of 10 % share of total installed capacity by 2012 [94] . 16 Examples are petitioning and fighting cases on behalf of wind energy investors, publishing wind energy generation data, dissemination of information on running of wind farms, conducting training programs for technicians and engineers, engaging in policy advocacy with energy utilities, interaction with government bodies and regulatory agencies, publishing wind industry magazines, and translating important lessons learned from wind energy development from other countries in India 17 The public sector organisations involved were the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation, Bharat Petroleum and the National Thermal Power Corporation.
behaviour and misuse of the accelerated depreciation measure also caused serious problems.
Higher import duties for wind turbine components and poor financial conditions of the state energy boards in India further resulted in unfavourable conditions for wind power investors in India [80] [82] [98] . Finally, the Ministry of Finance reduced the tax subsidy given to wind power producers with 50 % and the accelerated depreciation benefit was reduced from 100%
to 80% in 2002 [84] . Efforts from MNES to recommend policy modifications in customs and excise duties 18 and to continue the 100% accelerated depreciation for renewable energy technologies failed [99] .
In 1998, in an attempt to start reorganising the electricity sector, Civil society organizations such as the Prayas Energy Group also started to become prominent by organizing various forums for dialogue and sharing of experiences. They focused on articulating and protecting the interest of the general public in power sector reforms and regulatory processes [103] . Yet in general, civil society involvement in wind energy issues was very small, in particular in comparison with civil society involvement in leading countries such as Denmark and Germany.
18 Duties on import of raw materials for manufacturing of blades of wind turbines 19 Within the Indian Parliament, the Lok Sabha Committee on Energy and the Energy Policy Division of the Planning Commission became active for promoting renewable energy in India.
Creation of an indigenous innovation infrastructure
In 1998 MNES and IREDA also introduced the concept of "Wind Energy Estates," which were joint estate firms between state government and private developers. These firms' mandate was to acquire land, develop necessary infrastructure and grid facilities, obtain the necessary clearances and install, operate and maintain wind turbines on behalf of the investors. The wind energy estates helped in reducing the gestation period of wind projects as well as encourage small-scale investors [79] .
MNES also set up an expert committee for wind resource assessment and measurement covering 213 wind monitoring stations and 530 wind mapping stations in 25 states in India [104] . Furthermore wind measurement techniques were being developed with the use of meso-scale modelling. However, it remained challenging to prepare a comprehensive wind power density map for India [71] .
MNES provided incentives to develop wind turbines suitable for the specific Indian Despite MNES' efforts and increasing collaboration with foreign firms, many projects suffered from failure. This was caused by several factors. Skills and relevant know-how of project planning, site assessment and development and micro-siting in India continued to be limited. The performance of wind power installations was also poor in terms of capacity utilization factor (CUF) due to lack of monitoring of projects. In addition, the fact that investment decisions were based on availing tax incentives rather than on production incentives led to the instalment of low-quality and low-performance of wind turbines.
Malpractices such as wind investors getting false commissioning certificates were quite common [82] [92] [107] .
In the late 1990s wind turbines got destroyed in a cyclone in Gujarat. This event further reduced the image of wind turbines, painfully revealed poor installation practices of inexperienced wind entrepreneurs who were only interested in the subsidies. Wind companies often were not skilled in important issues such as negotiating with local communities, dealing with conflicts with state electricity boards and attracting sufficiently trained manpower for maintenance and infrastructure [108] . Nevertheless, in some cases local communities did support wind turbines as a result of promises on the creation of jobs and economic 21 The dependence on import of wind turbine parts was not reduced substantially, but activities of firms such LM Glasfiber India, Enercon India, and Suzlon helped in development of blade manufacturing technology through R&D activities in India. Special efforts were made to indigenize wind turbine components such as tower, generator, gearbox, controller and rotor blades with only a few critical components being imported have been made to indigenise the gearbox and controller [99] [79].
development in rural areas adjacent to wind farms [109] .
State energy utilities continued their resistance against granting third party sales to wind power producers. They saw wind power as a peripheral supply option with little consideration in long term energy planning. The believed wind energy only caused nuisance to the grid, created low network reliability and caused losses to state energy utilities [79] [82].
In the Indian power sector, plagued by reliability issues and structural inefficiencies, issues of grid integration, forecasting and scheduling were especially important [74] . 22 As a consequence, only a few manufacturers remained active in India at the end of the century. The interest of foreign collaborators reduced, due to slow market growth and low technological capabilities of Indian firms [80] . Though there was some improvement, India's knowledge base in wind energy generation and wind turbine manufacturing was weak and needed significant growth to be competitive at an international level [6] .
Towards upscaling of wind energy (2003-2012)
Creation of supportive techno-economic and socio-political networks
In 2002, the International Energy Agency (IEA), MNES and the Confederation of Indian Industry organised a workshop with over 150 different stakeholders to discuss policy goals for accelerating the deployment of renewable energy in India. This was also one of the first attempts to develop a comprehensive energy policy for India and served to include provisions in a draft of a new electricity bill [111] . The passing of Electricity Act in 2003 act streamlined and resolved many power sector issues. 23 The Electricity Act 2003 subsequently 22 With respect to problems of integration of wind energy into the gird, the Risø National Laboratory and CWET collaborated on a research project to study wind power integration in weak grids in India and improve the penetration of wind energy in the Indian grids conditions [110] . 23 The development of the Electricity Act was based on the Electricity Regulatory Commission Act of 1998 and was created as a result of a three year process with many rounds of debates, discussions and drafts.
led to the introduction of specific provisions for renewable energy sources in India
. 24 The social dynamics in terms of influencing energy decision making also changed as a result of the new electricity act. Despite many efforts of MNES, energy policy making India has so far been dominated by the Ministry of Power, which had been endowed with significant political, resource and discursive power. Indeed, a major barrier for renewable energy development in India has been the overall complexity of the Indian electricity sector Delhi [112] . For example, the Renewable Purchase Obligation (RPO), which mandates utilities to purchase renewable energy, was introduced in Maharashtra due to filing of a 24 Prior to enactment of Electricity Act 2003 there were no specific provisions in India for promotion of renewable energy in India as the issues were left to state electricity boards, state electricity regulatory commissions and MNES [113] . 25 An example is the National Action Plan on Climate Change specifying 15 % of India's energy needs from renewable energy sources by 2020, while the Integrated Energy Policy by the Planning Commission suggesting 5 % renewable energy in the overall energy mix by 2032 [74] . According to the Low Carbon report of the Planning Commission renewable energy does not play an important role in overall energy mix with the expert group assuming a moderate target of 30000MW by 2020, which is even less than the ambitious targets set by National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) by the PMO. The Working Group on Power constituted by the Planning Commission for the 12th five year plan (2012-2017) suggested greater clarity for wind power in terms of capacity addition of 11000 MW and meeting renewable energy purchase obligations [129] . 26 Guidelines were included on the preparation of consultation papers on the regulation proposed, drafting of proposed regulations followed by circulation of drafts in public for receiving comments and discussions and public hearings for drafting the regulations based on comments and discussions in the public hearing. Civil society and environmental groups also became more active in policy debates. 29 They raised concerns on high tariffs for wind energy and undue profits by wind developers, data asymmetry issues with respect to tariff calculations and energy equity. Also foreign wind energy organizations and networks played increasingly important roles in driving policy and regulatory agendas by translating learning experiences in the form of best practice guidelines from other countries and reliable advisory services to policy makers. The major supporters of the previous scheme, the Accelerated Depreciation (AD) benefit, were the small and medium scale industries (e.g. cement glass and textile firms).
They used AD benefit as margin money for ordering wind turbines and running their own industries with cheaper wind energy through captive mills. In this manner they were able to get low cost energy as well as recover majority of their investments early on [117] [118] [119] .
The government of India, however, saw AD as creating major losses in the form of lower corporate tax collection, excessive profits to small scale investors and to high project costs They joined with industry associations such as the Confederation of Indian Industry to promote priority sector financing for wind energy and requesting funds from the national clean energy initiative [124] [125] [126] . The advocacy succeeded and the generation based incentive was re-introduced recently [127] . Chances are accelerated depreciation will be reintroduced in the form of a direct tax code [123] .
The suitability of a feed-in tariff versus competitive bidding for procurement of wind energy is another issue that has been debated a lot. Wind energy forecasting and scheduling became another important area of concern.
Wind power producers were directed by the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission to schedule wind power and were penalized if their input into the grid varied more than 30 % of 31 The Forum of Regulators recommended introduction of competitive bidding on pilot basis to test the feasibility of the concept as international experience in U.K. and suggested to lower of tariffs but no significant capacity addition [128] [129]. 
Creation of an indigenous innovation infrastructure
The new institutional context enabled India to further develop a domestic manufacturing base through joint ventures, licensed production and subsidiaries of foreign companies [136] [137].
The main factors that contributed to growth with were the design of wind turbines for low wind speeds in India, which resulted in better capacity utilization. Also better site selection and rigorous wind resource assessment and micro-siting improved wind turbine performance were important. Efforts are going on for better aerodynamic design, higher towers, use of lighter and larger blade materials, variable speed gearless operation using advanced power electronics [98] [138] . Repowering of old wind turbines also gained importance in recent years to improve the efficiencies of the wind turbines [Int12] . However at the same time problems occurred in number of key wind turbine components such as bearings, gearboxes, generators, main shafts, control cabinets, and complex castings such as hubs and mainframes.
A major issue is the poor status of the energy grid in India. Existing grids and transmission system were not been able to cope with rapid growth of wind energy in India 
Conclusions
This paper asked the question how institutional entrepreneurship shaped the development of wind energy in India during the time period 1985-2013 and which controversies can be identified. The first part of the question is answered in by presenting the narrative in section 4
in three different time periods. By discussing the changing role of multiple actor groups we showed that development of wind energy in India was a collective accomplishment of many actors over the last 25-30 years, with no single actor having control over the entire process.
The second part of the question is answered as follows. During the first period (1985-1995), major issues were negotiations over cost of grid access and integration, wheeling and banking arrangements, third party sale and feed-in tariffs paid by the state electricity boards.
Major problems included poor installation practices, lack of project execution skills, lack of repair facilities, technical quality and safety design of wind turbines and excessive dependency on imported turbine components from EU without paying attention to use of turbines in Indian conditions. These issues created a negative image of the wind industry in India.
During the second time period (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) , conflicts and debates occurred over issues such as maintaining grid discipline due to fluctuating nature of wind energy, high fees charged by electricity boards for reactive power with wind developers resisting it. Also the integration of wind energy into weak Indian grids became an important issue of debate.
Debates have also been identified on the lack of transparency with the use of imported technologies as well as low level of indigenization and a lack of serious investors. This requires re-conceptualizing the issues of conflict and contestations in such a manner that view points and interests of different actors are awarded symmetric treatment according to their different orders of worth and value metrics [144] . In Indian energy policy making, it is necessary to be open towards new actors and find ways of justifying genuine participation procedures to include marginalized concerns (i.e. concerns of marginalized groups whose concerns excluded and rights are infringed). Future research should look at how these neglected actor groups can become a part of wind energy development in India.
